Kunst des klaren Denkens

indicators, oversold indicators, head-and-shoulder patterns, put-call ratios, the Fed’spolicy on money supply, foreign investment, the movement of the constellations through the heavens, and the moss on oak trees, and they can’t predict markets with any useful consistency, any more than the gizzard squeezers could tell the Roman emperors when the Huns would attack.« (ebenda) Börsenanalysten sind besonders gut im Nachhinein-Prognostizieren: »The analysts and the brokers. They don‘t know anything. Why do they always downgrade stocks after the bad earnings come out? Where‘s the guy that downgrades them before the bad earnings come out? That‘s the smart guy. But I don‘t know any of them. They‘re rare, they‘re very rare. They‘re rarer than Jesse Jackson at a Klan meeting.« (Perkins, Marc: 2000 TheStreet.com)
The Conjunction Fallacy
    Die Geschichte mit Klaus ist eine modifizierte Variante der sogenannten »Linda-Geschichte« bei Tversky und Kahneman: Tversky, Amos; Kahneman, Daniel: »Extension versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment«, Psychological Review 90 (4), Oktober 1983, S. 293–331 . Die Conjunction Fallacy wird deshalb auch »Linda-Problem« genannt.
    Das Beispiel mit dem Ölverbrauch ist ein bisschen modifiziert und vereinfacht. Das Originalbeispiel hier: Tversky, Amos; Kahneman, Daniel: »Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment«, Psychological Review 90 (4), Oktober 1983, S. 293–315.
    Zu den beiden Arten des Denkens – intuitiv vs. rational bzw. System 1 vs. System 2, siehe: Kahneman, Daniel: »A perspective on judgement and choice«, American Psychologist 58, 2003, S. 697–720.
Framing
    Tversky, Amos; Kahneman, Daniel: »The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice«, Science, New Series, Vol. 211, 1981, S. 453–458.
    Der Framing-Effekt in der Medizin, siehe: Dawes, Robyn M.: Everyday Irrationality: How Pseudo-Scientists, Lunatics, and the Rest of Us Systematically Fail to Think Rationally , Westview Press, 2001, S. 3 ff.
    Shepherd, R. et al.: »The effects of information on sensory ratings and preferences: The importance of attitudes«, Food Quality and Preference 3 (3), 1991–1992, S. 147–155.
The Action Bias
    Bar-Eli, Michael et al.: »Action Bias among Elite Soccer Goalkeepers: The Case of Penalty Kicks«, Journal of Economic Psychology 28 (5), 2007, S. 606–621.
    Warren Buffett verweigert sich erfolgreich dem Action Bias: »We don’t get paid for activity , just for being right . As to how long we’ll wait , we’ll wait indefinitely .« (Buffett, Warren: Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting 1998)
    »The stock market is a no-called-strike game. You don’t have to swing at everything – you can wait for your pitch. The problem when you’re a money manager is that your fans keep yelling, ›Swing, you bum!‹« (Buffett, Warren: Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting 1999)
    »It takes character to sit there with all that cash and do nothing. I didn’t get to where I am by going after mediocre opportunities.« (Munger, Charlie: Poor Charlie’s Almanack , Third Edition, Donning, 2008, S. 61)
    »Charlie realizes that it is difficult to find something that is really good. So, if you say ›No‹ ninety percent of the time, you’re not missing much in the world.« (ebenda S. 99)
    »There are huge advantages for an individual to get into a position where you make a few great investments and just sit on your ass: You’re paying less to brokers. You’re listening to less nonsense.« (ebenda S. 209)
The Omission Bias
    Baron, Jonathan: Thinking and Deciding , Cambridge University Press, 1988, 1994, 2000.
    Asch, D. A. et al.: »Omission bias and pertussis vaccination«, Medical Decision Making 14, 1994, S. 118–124.
    Baron, Jonathan; Ritov, Ilana: »Omission bias, individual differences, and normality«, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 94, 2004, S. 74–85.
    Siehe auch: »Der Unterlassungseffekt«, Kapitel aus der Dissertation: Schweizer, Mark: Kognitive Täuschungen vor Gericht , Zürich, 2005.
The Self-Serving Bias
    Schlenker, B. R.; Miller, R. S.: »Egocentrism in groups: Self-serving biases or logical information processing?«, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 35, 1977, S. 755–764.
    Miller, D. T.; Ross, M.: »Self-serving biases in the attribution of causality: Fact or fiction?«, Psychological Bulletin 82, 1975, S. 213–225.
    Arkin, R. M.; Maruyama,