The Complete Aristotle (eng.)

language—either current
terms or, it may be, rare words or metaphors. There are also many
modifications of language, which we concede to the poets. Add to
this, that the standard of correctness is not the same in poetry
and politics, any more than in poetry and any other art. Within the
art of poetry itself there are two kinds of faults—those which
touch its essence, and those which are accidental. If a poet has
chosen to imitate something, [but has imitated it incorrectly]
through want of capacity, the error is inherent in the poetry. But
if the failure is due to a wrong choice—if he has represented a
horse as throwing out both his off legs at once, or introduced
technical inaccuracies in medicine, for example, or in any other
art—the error is not essential to the poetry. These are the points
of view from which we should consider and answer the objections
raised by the critics.
    First as to matters which concern the poet’s own art. If he
describes the impossible, he is guilty of an error; but the error
may be justified, if the end of the art be thereby attained (the
end being that already mentioned)—if, that is, the effect of this
or any other part of the poem is thus rendered more striking. A
case in point is the pursuit of Hector. if, however, the end might
have been as well, or better, attained without violating the
special rules of the poetic art, the error is not justified: for
every kind of error should, if possible, be avoided.
    Again, does the error touch the essentials of the poetic art, or
some accident of it? For example, not to know that a hind has no
horns is a less serious matter than to paint it inartistically.
    Further, if it be objected that the description is not true to
fact, the poet may perhaps reply, ‘But the objects are as they
ought to be’; just as Sophocles said that he drew men as they ought
to be; Euripides, as they are. In this way the objection may be
met. If, however, the representation be of neither kind, the poet
may answer, ‘This is how men say the thing is.’ applies to tales
about the gods. It may well be that these stories are not higher
than fact nor yet true to fact: they are, very possibly, what
Xenophanes says of them. But anyhow, ‘this is what is said.’ Again,
a description may be no better than the fact: ‘Still, it was the
fact’; as in the passage about the arms: ‘Upright upon their
butt-ends stood the spears.’ This was the custom then, as it now is
among the Illyrians.
    Again, in examining whether what has been said or done by some
one is poetically right or not, we must not look merely to the
particular act or saying, and ask whether it is poetically good or
bad. We must also consider by whom it is said or done, to whom,
when, by what means, or for what end; whether, for instance, it be
to secure a greater good, or avert a greater evil.
    Other difficulties may be resolved by due regard to the usage of
language. We may note a rare word, as in oureas men proton, ‘the
mules first [he killed],’ where the poet perhaps employs oureas not
in the sense of mules, but of sentinels. So, again, of Dolon:
‘ill-favored indeed he was to look upon.’ It is not meant that his
body was ill-shaped but that his face was ugly; for the Cretans use
the word eueides, ‘well-flavored’ to denote a fair face. Again,
zoroteron de keraie, ‘mix the drink livelier’ does not mean ‘mix it
stronger’ as for hard drinkers, but ‘mix it quicker.’
    Sometimes an expression is metaphorical, as ‘Now all gods and
men were sleeping through the night,’ while at the same time the
poet says: ‘Often indeed as he turned his gaze to the Trojan plain,
he marveled at the sound of flutes and pipes.’ ‘All’ is here used
metaphorically for ‘many,’ all being a species of many. So in the
verse, ‘alone she hath no part… , oie, ‘alone’ is metaphorical; for
the best known may be called the only one.
    Again, the solution may depend upon accent or breathing. Thus
Hippias of Thasos solved the difficulties in the lines, didomen
(didomen) de hoi, and to men hou (ou) kataputhetai ombro.
    Or again, the question may be solved by punctuation, as in
Empedocles: ‘Of a sudden things became mortal that before had
learnt to be immortal, and things unmixed before mixed.’
    Or again, by ambiguity of meaning, as parocheken de pleo nux,
where the word pleo is ambiguous.
    Or by the usage of language. Thus any mixed drink is called
oinos, ‘wine’. Hence Ganymede is said